Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a new family of simple games, which is referred to as the complementary weighted multiple majority game. For the two dimensional case, we prove that there are at most n+1 minimal winning coalitions (MWC for short), where n is the number of players. An algorithm for computing all the MWCs is presented, with a running time of O(n log n). Computing the main power indices, i.e. Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, Holler-Packel index, and Deegan-Packel index, can all be done in polynomial time. Still for the two dimensional case, we show that local monotonicity holds for all of the four power indices. We also define a new kind of stability: the C-stability. Assuming that allocation of the payoff among the winning coalition is proportional to players' powers, we show that C-stable coalition structures are those that contain an MWC with the smallest sum of powers. Hence, C-stable coalition structures can be computed in polynomial times.
Model Formulation
During the inception of the computer industry, each company had to produce all the computer components: it had to manufacture the disk drives, memory chips, monitors, application softwares, and even its own graphics chips. And of course it had to do its own marketing. When Dell entered this industry, it took quite a different strategy: Dell did not create any component itself, but bought them from its partners. All they did was to concentrate on a brand-new marketing mode, the nowadays well known direct mode, which made it so close not only to the customers but also to the suppliers that its founder Michael Dell called Dell and its partners as virtually integrated. This new kind of cooperation was remarkably close to such an extent that virtually integrated companies could be seemed in a great sense as a big whole company. For a simple instance, the cooperation with the monitor supplier Sony was roughly like this: Sony put the brand of Dell on each monitor, and Dell told the third-party logistics company UPS to pick up the exact number of monitors they needed every day from the plant of Sony and to deliver them directly to the customers. No warehouse, no inventory, no inefficient transportation, and even no quality testing. All liked in the same company. As we have seen, virtual integration made a great success, helping Dell grow into a $12 billion company in just 13 years (1984-1997) , and also bringing its partners large profit (for more information, see [25] ).
From the aspect of division of labor, what Dell and its partner did is quite easy to understand: Intel is expert in making CPUs, Sony in Monitors, and Dell in marketing. Working together, they provide excellent computers for customers and beat their competitors. This kind of specialization and complementary cooperation penetrate the whole economy of our society and play an essential role in the civilization of the human being. Back to the inception of the computer industry, our question is which companies would have been virtually integrated, should all of them have realized the power of virtual integration, as in time as Dell did? The interesting point of this problem is that it is not necessarily true that the perfect combination of companies, which could provide the best possible products to the customers and could surely beat their competitors, would have cooperated, since the better a company could produce a component, the more bargaining power in profit allocating it would have. Some company might be too powerful for others to be willing to cooperate with it.
To make theoretical analysis possible, we put the problem with game theory terms by making the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Player characterization).
Each player is characterized by a K-dim non-negative vector, which is called its characteristic vector. The K independent dimensions stand for all the main factors in evaluating a player. In the computer industry, for instance, they represent a company's abilities in making CPUs, monitors, etc., as well as its marketing and management; Assumption 2 (Cooperation rule). Each coalition is also characterized by a vector, whose components are the respective maximums of the corresponding components of the coalition members. This is a more concrete expression for specialization and complementary cooperation;
Assumption 3 (Winning rule). The coalition with the greatest competitive power wins the game with a fixed total profit of 1 unit, and all the others lose with zero profit. And the competitive power of each coalition is measured simply by summing all the components of its characteristic vector. With respect to research, the summation approach is equivalent to the weighted summation approach; Assumption 4 (Profit allocation rule). How to allocate the profit among the potential winners is pre-given and known to all, players do not need to bargain about this during the process of coalition formation. In this paper, we adopt the proportional rule according to the powers of the winners, which can be measured by various power indices.
Perfect information is also assumed. Formally, we are given a set of players N = {p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n }. Each player p j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) is characterized by a K-dim non-negative integral vector (p 
its characteristic vector, and q(C) = 1≤i≤K q i (C) its competitive power.
Suppose that π is the final coalition structure, i.e. π is a partition of N. C * is the winner of π, i.e. C * ∈ π and q(C * ) > q(C) for any other coalition C ∈ π. According to Assumption 4, the profit allocated to
where θ i is the power of p i , θ(C * ) = p j ∈C * θ j , and θ ∈ {ss, bz, hp, d p}. (ss is short for Shapley-Shubik index, bz for Banzhaf index, hp for Holler-Packel index, and d p for Deegan-Packel index. The exact definitions will be given in Section 2.3).
The main problem is to analyze which coalition structures are the most likely to form. Parallel to non-cooperative games, where an equilibrium is accepted as a solution or prediction, a stable coalition structure is seemed as the counterpart in coalition formation games. In Section 3, we will introduce a new kind of stability: the C-stability. Section 2 gives the preliminaries and related work. Section 4 & 5 are devoted to the two dimensional case; Section 6 finishes this paper with some concluding remarks.
Preliminaries and Related Work

Coalition formation games
There are two ways to represent a cooperative game, the characteristic function form and the partition function form. The model of cooperative game in the characteristic function form was first formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern in the monumental work Theory of Games and Economic Behavior(1944, [34] ). Formally, a cooperative game is characterized by a pair (N, v) , where N is the set of players and v the characteristic function, which is a set mapping from 2 N (the family of all the subsets of N) to the real field R, with a restriction that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition C, v(C) represents the payoff of C. The partition function form, which was introduced by Lucas and Thrall ( [22] ), is an extension of the characteristic function form: the payoff of any coalition is not determined by itself but by a coalition structure (a partition of N) that contains this coalition. Obviously, the model in our paper is of the partition function form, though the value of a coalition is determined by a corresponding partition in an extremely simple way.
In either model, there are three main research topics. As argued by Shenoy ([31] ), the following two problems are closely related: (1) what will be the final allocation of payoffs to each of the players; (2) which of the possible coalitions can be expected to form. The hardest topic is to study the two problems simultaneously ( [9, 15, 24, 35] ). The second main topic is about how to allocate the payoff fairly while assuming that the coalition structure is fixed ( [1, 2, 23, 30] ). And the third topic is to analyze which coalition structure can be expected while the payoff allocation rule is fixed. Games studying the third topic are called coalition formation games, to which our model belongs.
In coalition formation games, an initial step is to determine an allocation rule. In the first attempts to study coalition formation games, Shenoy ([31] ) took various allocation rules: the individually rational payoffs, the core, the Shapley value and the bargaining set, while Hart & Kurtz ( [18, 19] ) took the CS value. In this paper, we take the proportional rules according to their powers.
Though various allocation rules, each of which suits for certain environments, appear very differently, the ideas behind them are the same: besides joining a coalition to which a player eventually belong, he has other choices. A fair allocation rule has to take those choices into consideration, as they embody his bargaining power. And it is fairly reasonable that the more bargaining power a player has, the more he should be allocated. Other criteria to evaluate the fairness of an allocation rule as well as the power assessing rule are all kinds of monotonicities. In Section 5, we will study one of them: local monotonicity.
In coalition formation games, we expect that stable coalition structures are the ones to form. There are varieties of stabilities, compared with varieties of equilibria in noncooperative games. Intuitively speaking, a stable coalition structure is the one that no players will benefit by deviating from it. Main stability concepts are the follows: Nash stability ( [7] ), individual stability ( [7] ), contractually individual stability ( [7] ), and γ-core stability ( [18] ), δ-core stability ( [18] ).
Nash stability comes from the famous Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative games. It requires that no player will benefit if he leaves the original coalition to which he belongs and joins a new one. In this concept, there is no restriction for the players' movements. It is not appropriate to adopt Nash stability in this paper, because in our model any player's movement from outside of the potential winning coalition into it will be rejected unanimously by the original members as their interest will be harmed. In fact, if we do permit free movement, the only Nash stable structure is the one that contains merely the grand coalition N, unless there is a really powerful player who can beat all the other players. This is quite unreasonable.
To require that any player's movement into a coalition should not harm the original members gives the concept of individual stability, which was introduced by Bogomolnaia and Jackson ( [7] ) in studying the purely hedonic games. To further require that any player's movement should not harm members of the original coalition to which he belongs gives contractually individual stability. It's obvious that Nash stability implies individual stability, and individual stability further implies contractually individual stability. Therefore, the grand coalition solution, which we would like to exclude, still remains in both concepts for our model. Compared with the above three stabilities, γ-core stability and δ-core stability give consideration to the fact that a group of players may deviate together by forming a new coalition if they can benefit from doing so. The difference between the two concepts is that it assumes in the latter one that all the other players stay in their original coalitions, while in the former one it assumes that coalitions which are left by even one member break apart into singletons. Hart and Kurz ( [18] ) remarked also that the δ-core stability applies especially to large games. Neither of the two solution concepts' existence on our model is guaranteed: it is not hard to check that the simple example with six players
, has no stable coalition structure, neither in the sense of γ-core stability nor in the sense of δ-core stability, and with no regard to which of four the power indices is taken to measure the bargaining powers.
All of the above concepts except the γ-core stability assume that when a group of players (or merely one player) deviate from the original coalition structure, the other players remain unmoved. This assumption is really naive in our model. The affected coalition breaking apart into singletons is not reasonable in our model either. This is the main reason why we have to define a new stability concept.
Weighted multiple majority games
In simple games, a coalition C is called a winning coalition (WC for short) if v(C) = 1, and a losing coalition otherwise. C is called a minimal winning coalition (MWC for short) if it is winning and any of its proper subset is losing. The family of all the WCs is written as WC, and the family of all MWCs is written as MWC. The model in our paper, the complementary weighted multiple majority game (C-WMMG for short), can be seemed as a simple game. Actually, in the C-WMMG, it is natural to define v(C) = 1 if q(C) > q(C − ), and v(C) = 0 otherwise, where C − = N \C. Then the above concepts for simple games can be easily carried over to our model. We will use them as well as the notations throughout this paper.
The weighted majority game (weighted voting game, weighted simple game, weighted threshold game, WMG for short) is one of the most intensively studied cooperative game models. A WMG is usually represented by G = (q; a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a n ), where q is called the quota and a j the weight of player p j . The characteristic function is defined as: Suppose
while in the model of this paper, v(C) = 1 is equivalent to
It is easy to see that there is some symmetry in the two models, and this is why we named our model as C-WMMG. To have more knowledge about WMG and WMMG, please refer Taylor and Zwicker ( [33] ).
Power indices
How to measure the powers of players in WMGs is a very interesting topic and has rich applications in politics. There are mainly four ways: the Shapley-Shubic index ( [32] ), the Banzhaf index ( [5] ), the Holler-Packel index (or public good index, [16, 21] ), as well as the Deegen-Packel index ( [12] ).
The exact definitions of the four power indices are as follows.
where the | · | is the cardinality of any set. Matsui and Matsui ([26, 27] ) proved that all the problems of computing the ShapleyShubik indices, the Banzhaf indices and the Deegan-Packel indices in WMGs are NPhard, and there are pseudo-polynomial time dynamic programming algorithms for them. Deng and Papadimitriou ( [13] ), who pioneered in the study of computational complexities for cooperative solution concepts, also proved that it is #P-complete to compute the Shapley-Shubik index. Matsui and Matsui ([27] ) also observed that Deng and Papadimitriou's proof can be easily carried over to the problem of computing the Banzhaf index.
For a special case where q = ⌊( 1≤ j≤n q j )/2⌋ + 1, which means that a coalition C is winning if and only if it can beat C − , it can be observed from their proofs that all the above complexity results hold. It is still not hard to prove that computing the HollerPackel index in WMGs, even in the same special case, is NP-hard, and the algorithm of Matsui and Matsui ([27] ) for computing the Deegan-Packel index can trivially be modified to compute the Holler-Packel index, with a even lower time complexity.
Computing all the four power indices in the two dimensional C-WMMGs, however, will be showed in Section 4 to be polynomially solvable.
C-stability
In this section, we will introduce a new stability concept: the C-stability. Our basic idea is as follows: once a group of players decide to leave their original coalitions and form a new coalition, all the other players will take actions to counterwork if this deviation harms them. Here actions may not definitely mean they form a whole coalition, because some of them may have not been harmed or some other coalition structure, consisting of the coalition formed by the deviating players, is better for some of them. Whatever, all the other players will start a new game again and form a new stable sub-structure, if it does exist. The deviating players, however, have already expected this reaction in advance. Therefore, we can define a structure as stable iff when any group of players deviate, all the other players will form a stable sub-structure, and some of the deviating player is not strictly better in this new structure compared with in the original one. There is still another problem, what if there is no stable sub-structure for the other players? We assume that all the deviating players are quite conservative. If no stable sub-structure exists for the other players, they deviate iff all of them will be strictly better off in any situation. That is, no matter what sub-structure the others form, they will always be better off.
As implied in the above argument, the concept of C-stability should be defined recursively. By ϕ we still denote the payoff allocation rule, i.e. ϕ(p j , π) is the payoff allocated to player p j in the structure π. 
holds for all p j ∈ C, 
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that π * is not C-stable and it is blocked by C. By definition,
, then in the case Π 1 |{C} is the set of the C-stable partitions, each C-stable partition π 1 must have a winner in π 1 ∪ {C} since otherwise it will be blocked by C − . This contradicts with C is the winner; In the case that Π 1 |{C} is the set of all the partitions of C − , C will not be the winner in
, all the partitions of C − will be C-stable w.r.t. {C}, and C is not a winner in {C − , C}, still a contraction.
* has a winning coalition. Denote it by C * . Suppose θ(C * ) > min{θ(C) : C ∈ MWC} and θ(C ′ ) = min{θ(C) : C ∈ MWC}. We prove that π * will be blocked by C ′ . In fact, for any
. This completes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
Notice that C-stable coalition structures may not be unique and which one will actually form, if there exists more than one, depends on extra factors in the practice. And we are quite clear that C-stable coalition structures are really determined by the coalitions which are the MWCs with the smallest sums of power. Therefore, we also call this kind of coalitions C-stable coalitions.
Remark 1. For the special one dimensional case, i.e. K = 1, there is exactly one Cstable coalition: the one that contains all the players with the largest weights.
Remark 2.
We explain why we exogenously required that a C-stable coalition structure must have a winning coalition ((i) in Def. 2). In fact, if we delete this requirement, some extreme coalition structures, which intuitively don't seem so stable, will be proved Cstable. For example, there are three players in total,
}} will be C-stable (in the sense that without condition (i)) and p 1 will be the winner. Note that {p 1 } is not a winning coalition since q(
Two assumptions are needed to justify this extreme case: (1) p 2 and p 3 are friendly enough. Since the forming of {p 2 , p 3 } will harm p 1 (there will be no winner in the new coalition structure), but will bring no benefit to themselves, they will not do it. (2) p 1 trusts p 2 and p 3 . In the real world, however, people are not always so friendly (like p 2 and p 3 ), either are they so risky (like p 1 ). In this kind of situation, to be safe, p 1 usually will welcome the joining of another player. Assuming that all the players are relatively conservative, we added condition (i) in Definition 2. To require that a group of players will deviate only if all of them will be strictly better off (instead of at least one player be strictly better off and none of them be worse off) has the same explanation.
Remark 3.
It is easy to analyze that PoA (Price of Anarchy) of C-WMMG, which is defined as
is exactly 0.5. In fact, in the one dimensional case, the optimal quality to actual quality ratio is always 1 and so is the PoA. In the two or higher dimensional cases, it is easy to see that q(N) ≥ q(C) + q(C − ) for any coalition C. Since q(C * ) > q(C * − ) in the Cstable coalition structure, we immediately have q(C * ) > 0.5q(N). To show the bound is tight, it suffices to see that in the simple case where there are only two players,
5, as w tends to infinity.
Algorithms for the Two Dimensional Case
This section is devoted to the computing issues of the two dimensional case.
Computing MWCs
The following two concepts are from the classical literatures for WMGs. For any winning coalition C, p j ∈ C is called a swing player (w.r.t. 
t. C).
Notice that it is possible that C has more than two busy players, and it is also possible that C has only one busy player. We also let
Lemma 1. Each winning coalition includes at least one MWC.
Proof. This property is straightforward as for each winning coalition we can dump the null players, if any, one by one until each of the remaining players are swing.
⊓ ⊔
The next lemma is obvious.
Lemma 2. For each winning coalition C, either A
Therefore, we can divide MWC into three sub-collections:
It's easy to see that:
where
We denote by M the set of all the idle players in the grand coalition N, i.e. M = N \ B(N). We let m = |M|, and re-index all the players in M as p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p m such that
In fact, it has only one potential member
Notice it may be true that p i ∈ D 1i .
Lemma 3. C 1i ∈ MWC1 i iff C 1i is a winning coalition and p i is both swing and busy
Proof. The necessary part is obvious, so we only have to show the sufficient part. As C 1i is winning and all its players are swing, we have C 1i ∈ MWC. Together with p i is busy in C 1i , we complete the proof. ⊓ ⊔ Similarly, we let MWC2 i = {C ∈ MWC : A 2 (C) = A 2 (N), p i ∈ A 1 (C)}, for i = 1, 2, · · · , m, and MWC2 i has only one potential member
Similar to Lemma 3, we have parallel result for C 2i . Due to the above analysis, an O(n 2 ) algorithm can be simply designed by roughly enumerating. To further reduce the time complexity, we need to explore more properties. Before describing our algorithm, we first present a tight upper bound for the number of MWCs.
Theorem 2. |MWC| ≤ n + 1.
Proof. In the case that A 1 (N) ∩ A 2 (N) ∅, MWC has at most two members: A 1 (N) and A 2 (N), and the theorem holds. So we assume later that 
By the above inequality and MWC1 i ∅, we have p j ∈ C 1i and p
Since MWC1 j ∅, inequality (22) tells us that p
Hence, all the members in T have one identical dimension. Without loss of generality, we assume that their second dimensions are the same. For arbitrary p i , p j ∈ T , suppose that MWC 1i MWC 1 j , next we will show that MWC 2i = MWC 2 j . Remember that p
From the above inequality, we immediate have p i ∈ C 2 j . Therefore, p
Inequality (24) and hence C 2i = C 2 j . According to the above property, either MWC 1i = MWC 1 j holds for all p i , p j ∈ T , or MWC 2i = MWC 2 j holds for all p i , p j ∈ T . Therefore,
For the case A 1 (N) is winning or A 2 (N) is winning, the theorem is trivially true. So we assume that q(A 1 (N)) < q(N \ A 1 (N)) and q(A 2 (N)) < q(N \ A 2 (N)). Therefore, MWC1 = 1≤ j≤m MWC1 j and MWC2 = 1≤ j≤m MWC2 j . Finally we have:
The next example illustrates that the upper bound in the above theorem is tight.
Example 2.
There are 4 kinds of players: (1) 4 huge players:
For each of the left player x j , 2 ≤ j ≤ t, MWC1 x j = ∅ and C 2x j = {p 3 , p 4 , x j , y t , y t−1 , · · · , y j } ∈ MWC2; For each of the right players y j , 2 ≤ j ≤ t, MWC2 y j = ∅ and C 1y j = {p 1 , p 2 , y j , x t , x t−1 , · · · , x j } ∈ MWC1; For the versatile player z, C 1z = {z, p 1 , p 2 , x t , x t−1 , · · · , x 2 } ∈ MWC1 and C 2z = {z, p 3 , p 4 , y t , y t−1 , · · · , y 2 } ∈ MWC2. Therefore, there are n = 2t + 3 players and |MWC| = 4 + 2(t − 1) + 2 = n + 1.
Just as observed in the the proof to Theorem 2, the A 1 (N) ∩ A 2 (N) ∅ case is trivial, so we only discuss the case
For each player p i ∈ M, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we give him a second index l(i), such that
where p l −1 (i) denotes the player in M whose second index is i,
It is easy to see that players in D 1i , if D 1i is not empty, have continuous indices. To be exact, let x(i) = max{ j : p j ∈ D 1i }, we have D 1i = {p j : 1 ≤ j ≤ x(i)}. Therefore, D 1i can be nicely determined by x(i). If D 1i = ∅, we simply let x(i) = 0. Similarly, let
By indexing, the next inclusion relations are obvious:
Equivalently:
Due to the above relationships, x(i)s and y(i)s can be computed in
. It is not hard to see that computing all the r 1 (i)s and r 2 (i)s can be done in O(m) time. Similar to Lemma 3, we have the following more concrete result.
Lemma 4. C 1i ∈ MWC1 i iff the following three conditions hold:
where p 1 m+1 is defined as 0. Proof. Condition (37) means that p i is busy in C 1i ; Condition (38) guarantees that C 1i is winning; Condition (39) says p i is swing in C 1i .
⊓ ⊔
The above lemma tells us that to determine whether C 1i ∈ MWC1 i or not takes constant time. Similar result holds for C 2i . A valuable notice is that even if C 1i ∈ MWC1 i and C 1 j ∈ MWC1 j , it is still possible that C 1i = C 1 j for i j. If this situation occurs, it must hold that p
Lemma 5. Suppose that p
Proof. First of all, observe that all the D 1l −1 (t) s are the same, i ≤ t ≤ j.
(a) We only have to show the sufficient part. In fact, C 1l −1 (t) ⊆ C 1l −1 (s) for any s t, i ≤ s ≤ j. Since the two coalitions are both MWC, they can only be identical.
(b) We only have to show the sufficient part. Otherwise, suppose that C 1l −1 (s) = C 1l −1 (t) for some s t. This implies that p l −1 (t) ∈ D 1l −1 (t) . According to (a), we have
⊓ ⊔ According to the above discussions, MWC1 and MWC2 can be computed in O(m) time. Since MWC3 is trivial, the algorithm for computing all the MWCs can be easily designed. 
Computing Holler-Packel indices and Deegan-Packel indices
As the Holler-Packel indices and Deegan-Packel indices are directly determined by MWC, computing them is routine. The A 1 (N)∩A 2 (N) ∅ case is trivial, so we assume that A 1 (N)∩A 2 (N) = ∅. We also suppose that
then
Similarly, let
we have
The formulas for calculating Holler-Packel indices are as follows.
Theorem 4. (a) If p j
and
Similarly, we have the following formulas for calculating Deegan-Packel indices.
Theorem 5. (a) If p j
Due to (35) and ( 
Computing WCs
Unlike Holler-Packel indices and Deegan-Packel indices, which are based on MWC, Banzhaf indices and Shapley-Shubik indices rely on WC. To compute the latter two power indices, we should first consider the structure of WC. Similar to the way we deal with MWC, we can divide WC into three sub-collections:
The next result is also easy.
Lemma 6. If p
} is a partition of M, such that players in the same subset have the same second dimensions and q 2 
From Lemma 6, we know that WC1 can be partitioned as {WC1 i :
Notice that for any C 1i ∈ W1 i , p i may not be swing in C 1i , and
the next result is self evident.
Proof. Computing W1 is almost the same as computing MWC1, except that (39) should be deleted in checking whether C 1i ∈ W1 i and Lemma 5 is useless.
⊓ ⊔
Similarly, we can define
, and parallel results hold. Since it is trivial to see that
we have in fact shown that all the WCs can be computed in O(n log n) time.
Computing Banzhaf indices and Shapley-Shubik indices
Computing Banzhaf indices and Shapley-Shubik indices are a litter more complicated, but basic ideas remain unchanged.
Lemma 9.
For any C 1i ∪ E ∈ WC1, where E ∈ E 1i , all the players in A 1 (N) ∪ D 1i are swing and all the players in E are null. ⊓ ⊔ For any C 1i ∈ W1, and p j ∈ C 1i , let bz( j, WC1 i ) be the number of winning coalitions in WC1 i such that p j is swing. Due to Lemma 7 and Lemma 9, the next result is obvious.
Lemma 10. For any C
or equivalent,
We also let E
and for all p j ∈ E 0 1i ,
Let
For all p j ∈ E 0 1i , let
then for any p j ∈ E 0 1i \ E 00 1i , B 1i j = ∅, and therefore
For any
For any 1 
For all 1
the next lemma is obvious.
Similarly, we define bz( j,
, then results parallel to Lemma 9, Lemma 10, Lemma 11 hold.
For any p j ∈ N, bz( j, WC3) is defined as the number of winning coalitions in WC3 such that p j is swing. Due to (57), the next result is trivial.
Lemma 12. (a) If p j
we have the following formulas for computing Banzhaf indices.
Theorem 8. (a) If p j
where 
Computing C-stable coalitions
After computing MWC and all the power indices, due to Theorem 2 and (33) 
Local Monotonicity
In this section, we will prove that local monotonicity, which says that players with larger weighs have more power than the ones with smaller weights, holds for all the four power indices in the two dimensional complementary WMMGs. We note that in WMGs, this property is not shared by the Holler-Packel index or Deegan-Packel index, but by Banzhaf index and Shapley-Shubik index. First of all, it is trivial that this property holds for Banzhaf index and Shapley-Shubik index (for arbitrary dimension, in fact). To verify that it also holds for Holler-Packel index and Deegan-Packel index, we need two lemmas.
Lemma 13. C ∈ MWC, then the following properties hold: (a) ∀p j ∈ C, either p j is busy in C or p j is busy in C
, and they can't hold simultaneously; (c) If
, and they can't hold simultaneously.
Proof. (a) If p j is a busy player of C, the proof is finished. Otherwise, C ∈ MWC implies q(C) > q(C − ) and
It is trivial that they can't hold simultaneously, since C is a winning coalition.
(c) Since |A 1 (C)| ≥ 2 and A 1 (C) A 2 (C), we can take some
. They can't hold simultaneously, since C is a winning coalition.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 14.
Proof. (a) Without loss of generality, we assume that t = 1. Suppose that C 1 C 2 , then C 2 ∈ MWC and C 1 is a winning coalition imply that C 1 \ C 2 ∅. Take some player 
As p k 0 C 2 and C 2 is a winning coalition, we have p j ∈ C 2 . Therefore A k (C Suppose C 1 C 2 , then C 1 \ C 2 ∅. Take any player p k 0 ∈ C 1 \ C 2 . If p k 0 is an idle player of C 1 , the proof is done similar to (a). So we assume that p k 0 is a busy player of C 1 . We still have p k 0 ∈ A 2 (C 1 ) \ {y} from A 1 (C 1 ) = A 1 (C 2 ) = {p i 0 } and y ∈ A 2 (C 1 ) ∩ A 2 (C 2 ).
By Lemma 13(c), q k (C 1 ) ≤ q k (C − 1 ) some k ∈ {1, 2}. C 1 ∈ MWC tells us:
If (p k 0 , p k 0 ) ∈ A(C − 1 ∪ {p k 0 }), we will have q(p k 0 ) ≥ q(C 1 ), and p k 0 ∈ A 1 (C 1 ) = {p i 0 }, which contradicts p k 0 ∈ C 1 \ C 2 . Therefore, there exists some w ∈ C − 1 such that q({w, p k 0 }) ≥ q(C 2 ). As p k 0 C 2 , we have w ∈ C 2 from the fact that C 2 is a winning coalition. We further have w ∈ A 1 (C 2 ). Since w p i 0 , this is a contradiction with Remark 5. As opposed to the commonly accepted viewpoint that the violation of local monotonicity is a fatal drawback in power measuring, Holler and Naple ( [20] ) argue that it is this violation that reflects the real power of power measuring through power indices instead of directly by weights.
Concluding Remarks
For further research, an obvious direction is to discuss the higher dimensional cases. It is meaningful to analyze various other monotonicities. In particular, counter examples can easily be constructed to show that new member monotonicity, which says that when a new member enters into the game, normalized powers (original powers divided by the total power) of initial players will not increase, is violated by all the four power indices. The paradox of redistribution, which says that a player's (normalized) power may decrease when its weight increases, will not occur in any of the four power indices, as conjectured by the authors. Does example similar to Example 4 exist for the ShapleyShubik index and Banzhaf index is also an open question.
It is well known that any simple game is equivalent to a WMMG, and this explores the dimension theory. In a similar way, we can show that every simple game is equivalent to a C-WMMG. Therefore, a similar dimension concept can be defined, and lots of problems are waiting to be studied.
It is also interesting to apply C-stability to other coalition formation game models. We remark here that the idea of defining a stability concept recursively, as well as considering the counter actions of players, has been used by Barberà and Gerber ([6] ) in defining the concept of durability for purely hedonic games. Since introducing their concept takes a large space, interested readers please refer the original paper.
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